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STATE ACTION AND GENDER (IN)EQUALITY: THE 
UNTAPPED POWER OF WASHINGTON’S EQUAL 
RIGHTS AMENDMENT 
Maria Yvonne Hodgins* 
Abstract: Washington’s Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) is a powerful legal tool. Its 
sweeping, protective language triggers the application of an absolute standard of review—a 
level of review even higher than strict scrutiny. Yet the ERA is underutilized by litigants 
seeking protection against gender-based discrimination. This may be due to the inconsistencies 
in the Washington State Supreme Court’s state action jurisprudence. Though the ERA includes 
the phrasing “under the law,” its plain language does not necessarily support a finding of a 
state action requirement. 
The state action doctrine is grounded in federalism and separation of power concerns that 
are not present at the state level. Therefore, the Washington State Supreme Court is free to 
construe the amendment as lacking a state action requirement. Despite the ambiguity of the 
amendment’s text, and the absence of federalism concerns at the state level, the Washington 
State Supreme Court has interpreted a state action requirement to be implicit within the ERA. 
The Court’s state action jurisprudence with respect to other constitutional provisions—
Washington’s Privacy, Due Process, and Free Speech provisions—is similarly inconsistent and 
overly reliant on analogous provisions in the U.S. Constitution. These inconsistencies in the 
state action doctrine restrict the efficacy of provisions such as the ERA. The Washington State 
Supreme Court must adjust its understanding of the state action requirement, thus enabling the 
ERA to fill in statutory gaps in protection against sex-based discrimination and become a 
stronger guardian of gender equality. 
INTRODUCTION 
Washington’s Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) reads “[e]quality of 
rights and responsibility under the law shall not be denied or abridged on 
account of sex.”1 Washington courts have interpreted its protective 
language to trigger an absolute bar on discrimination—a standard of 
review even higher than the highest federal standard.2 This absolute 
prohibition on gender-based classifications makes the ERA a powerful 
tool. However, despite the ERA’s strong language, it is underutilized by 
litigants seeking protection against gender-based discrimination. This 
                                                     
   * J.D. Candidate 2020, University of Washington School of Law. Thank you to Professor Hugh 
Spitzer for his guidance and expertise. Special thanks to both my grandmother and my father for their 
thoughtful edits. 
1. WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1. 
2. Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 870–71 540 P.2d 882, 889 (1975). 
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may be due to the Washington State Supreme Court’s inconsistent state 
action jurisprudence. The court has interpreted the ERA to have a state 
action requirement, although its text is ambiguous.3 The state action 
doctrine is founded on concerns of federalism and separation of powers 
that are present at the federal level, but which are absent at the state level.4 
Thus, the Washington State Supreme Court is free to interpret the ERA as 
lacking a state action requirement. 
In Part I, this Comment examines the history of Washington’s ERA—
which traces its origins to the failed federal amendment—and finds that 
the language of Washington’s ERA intentionally differs from the failed 
federal provision. This Comment proceeds by arguing in Part II that the 
standard of review applied by Washington courts is a point of strength, 
while its state action requirement is a point of weakness. In Part III, this 
Comment focuses on the inconsistencies in Washington’s state 
constitutional rights jurisprudence with respect to the state action 
requirement. This Comment determines in Part IV that, absent a state 
action requirement, the ERA would be a more useful tool, able to fill the 
statutory gaps in protection against gender-based discrimination. This 
Comment ultimately argues that the Washington State Supreme Court 
should interpret the ERA to lack a state action requirement: an 
interpretation which would ultimately be beneficial to litigants. 
I. THE HISTORY OF THE VARIOUS EQUAL RIGHTS 
AMENDMENTS 
A. The History (and Failure) of the Federal Equal Rights Amendment 
Washington’s ERA, Article XXXI of the Washington Constitution, has 
roots in the failed passage of the federal Equal Rights Amendment.5 On 
July 9, 1978, women’s rights advocates marched onto the national mall, 
demanding the ratification of the federal amendment by the states.6 
                                                     
3. See, e.g., Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 862, 540 P.2d 882, 884 (1975) (asking whether 
denying girls permission to play on a high school football team constituted “a discrimination by state 
action”). The court did not analyze whether Washington’s ERA actually contained a state action 
requirement. Id. In MacLean v. First Northwest Indus. of Am., Inc., 96 Wash. 2d 338, 347, 635 P.2d 
683, 688 (1981), the Court stated that the parties had agreed that it is necessary to show that state 
action was involved in order to maintain an action under Washington’s ERA. The Court did not focus 
on the existence of a state action requirement within Washington’s ERA. Id. 
4. See infra section II.B.2. 
5. See Mary Patrice McCausland, Washington’s Equal Rights Amendment and Law Against 
Discrimination—the Approval of the Seattle Sonics’ “Ladies’ Night”—MacLean v. First Northwest 
Industries, Inc., 96 Wn. 2d 338, 635 P.2d 683 (1981), 58 WASH. L. REV. 465, 466 (1983). 
6. See Tracey Jean Boisseau & Tracy A. Thomas, After Suffrage Comes Equal Rights? ERA as the 
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However, by the time this women’s march on Washington took place, the 
fight over the ERA had been going on for over half a century.7 The first 
federal Equal Rights Amendment was proposed formally by Alice Paul, 
the American suffragist and women’s rights activist, in 1923.8 At the 
seventy-fifth anniversary of the 1848 Women’s Rights Convention in 
Seneca Falls, New York, Paul declared the absolute need for such an 
amendment.9 Paul’s amendment was introduced in 1923 to Congress by 
both a representative10 and a senator of Kansas.11 The amendment was 
introduced unsuccessfully to every Congress thereafter without actually 
being debated until 1972.12 Despite these repeated introductions to 
Congress, the amendment effectively languished for decades until the 
civil rights movement of the 1960’s renewed interest.13 
Women’s rights activists, troubled by their lack of victories in 
litigation, turned once more to the passage of the federal Equal Rights 
Amendment.14 By 1972, both the House and the Senate had 
overwhelmingly passed the federal Equal Rights Amendment, with the 
House voting in favor of the amendment 354–23 and the Senate voting in 
favor 84–8.15 The Senate then provided “a seven-year timeline for the 
required three-fourths of the states to ratify the amendment.”16 The text of 
the federal amendment read: “Equality of rights under the law shall not be 
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of 
sex.”17 
Meanwhile, gender equality advocates continued to fight this battle 
through litigation.18 In 1971, the Supreme Court decided Reed v. Reed,19 
                                                     
Next Logical Step, in 100 YEARS OF THE NINETEENTH AMENDMENT: AN APPRAISAL OF WOMEN’S 
POLITICAL ACTIVISM 227, 227 (Holly J. McCammon & Lee Ann Banaszak eds., Oxford Univ. Press 
2018). 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 230. 
9. Id. 
10. The representative, Daniel Read Anthony, was the nephew of the celebrated suffragist Susan 
B. Anthony. See id. 
11. Id. 
12. See Sarah A. Soule & Brayden G. King, The Stages of the Policy Process and the Equal Rights 
Amendment, 1972–1982, 111 AM. J. OF SOC. 1871, 1871–72 (2006). 
13. See Boisseau & Thomas, supra note 6, at 241. 
14. Id. at 242. 
15. Id. at 243. 
16. Id. 
17. H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 86 Stat. 1523 (1972). 
18. See Boisseau & Thomas, supra note 6, at 246. 
19. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
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a landmark victory for women’s rights activists.20 This was the first time 
the Court held that a law discriminating on the basis of sex violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.21 Then, in 1973, 
the Supreme Court decided Frontiero v. Richardson,22 a landmark case 
for gender equality. But the victory for gender equality advocates in 
Frontiero was bittersweet.23 Although the plurality in Frontiero argued 
for the application of strict scrutiny to sex-based classifications,24 the 
concurrence argued that the Court should wait for the seemingly imminent 
passage of the federal Equal Rights Amendment, which would settle the 
tier of scrutiny question.25 The concurrence noted, “[t]he Equal Rights 
Amendment . . . if adopted will resolve the substance of this precise 
question.” Furthermore, the concurrence argued, “democratic institutions 
are weakened, and confidence in the restraint of the Court is impaired, 
when we appear unnecessarily to decide sensitive issues of broad social 
and political importance at the very time they are under consideration 
within the prescribed constitutional processes.”26 Thus, the Court waited 
for the outcome of the ratification process and failed to settle the question 
of the standard of review.27 
The Supreme Court’s 1976 decision in Craig v. Boren28 underscored 
“the Court’s ambivalence about both the procedural and substantive 
aspects of a revolution in gender roles.”29 As the federal Equal Rights 
Amendment had not yet been adopted, the Court in Craig applied 
intermediate scrutiny to sex-based classifications, rather than the strict 
scrutiny standard supported by both the majority in Reed and the plurality 
in Frontiero.30 This was a “Goldilocks solution”—merely a partial victory 
for gender equality advocates.31 
By 1973, twenty-four states had ratified the federal Equal Rights 
Amendment and it appeared that others would follow this “trajectory” 
                                                     
20. See Boisseau & Thomas, supra note 6, at 245. 
21. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76 (1971). 
22. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
23. See Boisseau & Thomas, supra note 6, at 245. 
24. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688. 
25. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring). 
26. Id. 
27. Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677. 
28. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
29. See Serena Mayeri, Constitutional Choices: Legal Feminism and the Historical Dynamics of 
Change, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 755, 826 (2004). 
30. Craig, 429 U.S. at 217–19 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
31. See Mayeri, supra note 29, at 826. 
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toward ratification.32 However, the Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Roe 
v. Wade33 resulted in a shift in the debate, ultimately slowing the states’ 
ratification of the amendment.34 Some members of the anti-abortion 
movement worried that the federal Equal Rights Amendment would 
expand abortion rights,35 while others insisted that the amendment would 
actually increase protections for both women and their unborn children.36 
This disagreement within the pro-life movement was a precipitating factor 
that led to a shift in the national consensus on the federal Equal Rights 
Amendment.37 This was partly due to a shift from the public’s concern 
with “abstract principles of equality”38 to more concrete concerns over 
women being required to register for the draft.39 
Although by 1977 thirty-five states had ratified the amendment, five 
states had rescinded their previous ratifications.40 The effect was 
disastrous for supporters of the amendment.41 Despite an extension of the 
seven-year deadline issued by Congress, in 1982 the amendment was still 
“three states short of the required 38 states.”42 The federal Equal Rights 
Amendment was not quite dead—as evidenced by repeated attempts to 
revive it over the following decades—but “it was at least comatose.”43 
Today, the fight over the federal amendment endures as gender equality 
advocates continue to champion it.44 Hollywood celebrities, members of 
Congress, and feminist organizations have joined together to promote the 
addition of a constitutional guarantee of gender equality.45 This movement 
is focused on the problems that women still face in the United States, such 
as “pay inequity, violence against women, employers’ failures to 
accommodate pregnancy, and the general lack of public support for child-
                                                     
32. See Boisseau & Thomas, supra note 6, at 243. 
33. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
34. See Boisseau & Thomas, supra note 6, at 244. 
35. See MARY ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF THE ABORTION DEBATE 37 (2015). 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. See Boisseau & Thomas, supra note 6, at 243. 
39. Id. at 244. 
40. Id. It is still unclear whether states’ rescissions of their ratification votes were legal. See id. at 245. 
41 Id. at 245. 
42. Soule & King, supra note 12, at 1872. 
43. See Boisseau & Thomas, supra note 6, at 245. 
44. Id. at 248. 
45. See Julie C. Suk, An Equal Rights Amendment for the Twenty-First Century: Bringing Global 
Constitutionalism Home, 28 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 381, 383 (2017). 
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rearing.”46 The ongoing battle over the federal Equal Rights Amendment 
highlights the systemic injustices and discrimination still faced by women, 
and the limitations of the laws that currently exist to address these 
concerns.47 “If I could choose an amendment to add to the Constitution, it 
would be the Equal Rights Amendment,” stated Justice Ginsburg to the 
National Press Club in 2014.48 She continued, “[L]egislation can be 
repealed, it can be altered . . . [s]o I would like my granddaughters, when 
they pick up the Constitution, to see that notion—that women and men 
are persons of equal stature.”49 
B. The History (and Moderate Success) of State’s Equal Rights 
Amendments 
Despite the failed passage of the federal Equal Rights Amendment, 
many individual states have adopted some variation of the amendment 
into their own constitutions.50 Most of these states adopted their versions 
of the Equal Rights Amendment between 1971 and 1978, the time period 
in which the federal amendment was in the process of ratification by the 
states.51 The language of these state provisions parallel the text of the 
proposed federal amendment in only some instances.52 While many state 
amendments closely track the language of the failed federal amendment,53 
others use language more similar to that of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.54 Currently, almost half of the states have 
adopted their own Equal Rights Amendments.55 The earliest state 
amendment was adopted in 1879 by California.56 In January 2019, 
Delaware became the most recent state to adopt such an amendment.57 
                                                     
46. Id. at 388. 
47. Id. 




50.  See Suk, supra note 45, at 383. 
51. See LESLIE W. GLADSTONE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20217, EQUAL RIGHTS 
AMENDMENTS: STATE PROVISIONS 1–2 (2004). 
52. See Judith Avner, Some Observations on State Equal Rights Amendments, 3 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 144, 146 (1984). 
53. Id. at 146. 
54. See GLADSTONE, supra note 51, at 1. 
55. See Suk, supra note 45, at 383. 
56. See GLADSTONE, supra note 51, at 1. 
57. Randall Chase, Delaware Equal Rights Amendment Gets Final Approval, DEL. ONLINE (Jan. 
16, 2019) https://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/2019/01/16/delaware-equal-rights-
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Despite the existence of these state amendments, they are not widely 
litigated.58 Courts tend to avoid reaching decisions based on state Equal 
Rights Amendments.59 Rather, state judges generally base their decisions 
on other grounds, either statutory or constitutional,60 and litigants more 
commonly rely on state antidiscrimination statutes.61 This is perhaps 
“attributable to the innate conservatism and hesitancy of the bar and 
bench,” the untried nature of these amendments, the variation in the 
standard of review applied by different states, or the similarly inconsistent 
state action requirement.62 
C. The History of Washington’s Equal Rights Amendment 
Washington added its own version of the federal Equal Rights 
Amendment, Article XXXI of the Washington Constitution, in 1972.63 
Representative Lois North, the primary sponsor of the amendment, 
introduced House Joint Resolution No. 61, “Providing for equality of 
rights regardless of sex.”64 The Washington state senators debated 
possible exceptions to the amendment.65 Senator Perry Woodall asked 
whether, under this new amendment, it would be prohibited to hire only 
individuals of a specific gender to be restroom attendants.66 Senator 
Francis replied, “if there is a valid reason for a distinction . . . if it involves 
an invasion of privacy or some other function . . . there will still be some 
sexual distinction that will be valid and will not be arbitrary.”67 Senator 
Francis continued, “it says equality of rights and responsibilities and 
maybe that needs to be delineated on a case by case basis. But what we 
are saying is that sexes are equal.”68 
The 1972 House and Senate Journals provide no explanation for the 
amendment’s lack of an unambiguous, explicit state action requirement,69 
                                                     
amendment-gets-final-approval/2597949002/ [https://perma.cc/S3VW-ZJ29]. 




62. Id. at 146–47. 
63. WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1. 
64. H.J., 42d Leg., 2d Ex. Sess. 50 (Wash. 1972). 
65. See S.J., 42d Leg., 2d Ex. Sess. 345–47 (Wash. 1972). 
66. Id. at 346. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. See H.J., 42d Leg., 2d Ex. Sess. 274 (Wash. 1972); S.J., 42d Leg., 2d Ex. Sess. 345-47 (Wash. 
1972). 
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and relevant articles in The Seattle Times are similarly unhelpful.70 A 
single 1972 article told readers that passage of the state ERA would mean 
that “[s]uch matters as opening doors for women, caring for children and 
supporting a family would remain a matter of individual choice. The 
amendment applies only to things ‘that come under the law.’”71 One 
useful, historical source is the 1972 Washington Voters’ Pamphlet, 
written by the Washington Attorney General, which makes direct 
reference to a possible state action requirement within the ERA: 
This proposed amendment . . . would apply to acts done under 
authority of law, but not to the private conduct of persons. Thus, 
state and local government could not treat persons differently 
because they are of one sex or the other. Individual persons acting 
in their private capacities would, however, not be prohibited by 
the amendment from making distinctions and expressing 
preferences between other persons because of their sex.72 
The pamphlet’s statement in support of the proposed amendment also 
wrote that its passage would “have no effect on private life. The 
amendment is only concerned with what happens ‘under the law.’”73 
Despite the wording of the voters’ pamphlet, which implies a state action 
requirement, the statements for or against in a pamphlet are not binding 
on Washington courts.74 The voters’ pamphlet may be somewhat 
persuasive when courts want it to be.75 
Washington courts “have previously considered statements in favor of 
ballot measures in determining the effect of the measure and have 
specifically done so with regard to the ERA.”76 In ascertaining the 
meaning of a law, “[m]aterial in the official voters’ pamphlet may be 
considered by the court in determining the purpose and intent of [the 
                                                     
70. The newspaper now known as The Seattle Times was then named The Seattle Daily Times. 
71. Byron Johnsrud, “Rights Amendment Gets Male Support,” SEATTLE DAILY TIMES, Aug. 18, 
1972, at D1. 
72. LUDLOW KRAMER, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF WASHINGTON, OFFICIAL VOTERS’ 
PAMPHLET 53 (1972) [hereinafter VOTERS’ PAMPHLET]. 
73. Id. at 52. 
74. See Andersen v. King County, 158 Wash. 2d 1, 49 n. 19, 138 P.3d 963 (2006). 
75. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 149 Wash. 2d 660, 687, 72 P.3d 
151 (2003) (finding that “where the court finds that a law is susceptible to multiple interpretations, 
the standard tools of statutory construction apply to determine the voter’s intent, including resorting 
to extrinsic sources,” and that voters’ pamphlets may be used by the court). 
76. The Washington State Supreme Court considered the statements in the voters’ pamphlet on 
same-sex marriage and found that the pamphlet indicated that the ERA was not intended to grant 
same-sex couples the right to marry. See Andersen, 158 Wash. 2d at 49, 138 P.3d at 989 (citing 
Marchioro v. Chaney, 90 Wash. 2d 298, 305, 582 P.2d 487, 491 (1978)). 
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provision].”77 Where a law is ambiguous, intent becomes a relevant 
factor.78 Although courts should focus on the collective intent of the 
voters, “[w]here possible, the intent of the electorate is to be derived 
initially from the language of the statute itself.”79 An analysis of the plain 
language of Washington’s ERA indicates that its text lacks an explicit, 
unambiguous state action requirement. Thus, Washington courts need not 
look farther than the language of the provision itself in search of 
legislative intent; interpreting a statute using this “plain meaning 
approach” is “more likely to carry out legislative intent.”80 
Washington’s proposed ERA went on the ballot in 1972.81 The 
pamphlet mailed to Washington voters read, “It is presently 
permissible . . . in some instances, to base legal classifications of persons 
solely upon sex.”82 The pamphlet’s statement in support of the amendment 
assured voters that its adoption would not “Mean an End to All Sexually 
Segregated Facilities,” such as “restrooms, hospital wards and lingerie 
departments.”83 The voters’ pamphlet also stated that it was not an 
amendment for women’s rights, and that it did not “protect just a minority. 
It protects the rights of all persons not to have the law discriminate against 
them solely on the basis of sex.”84 
The pamphlet’s statement against the adoption of the amendment, in 
contrast, argued, “it is absolutely ridiculous to have girls compete with 
boys on the high school wrestling team.”85 The statement against the 
amendment also told voters that its adoption would mean that “[h]omosexual 
and lesbian marriage would be legalized . . . the beauty and sanctity of 
marriage must be preserved from such needless desecration.”86 
The Washington State Women’s Council met in November of 1972 to 
discuss the state ERA’s official statements in the Voters’ Pamphlet, and a 
number of the amendment’s supporters felt “that statements made by 
opponents of the measure were not accurate.”87 As Washington voters’ 
                                                     
77. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue v. Hoppe, 82 Wash. 2d 549, 552, 512 P.2d 1094, 1096 (1973). 
78. See State v. Thorne, 129 Wash. 2d 736, 763, 921 P.2d 514, 526–27 (1996). 
79. See, e.g., id. (holding that in searching for legislative intent, courts should look first to the plain 
language of the statute). 
80. Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash. 2d 1, 11–12, 43 P.3d 4, 10 (2002). 
81. See VOTERS’ PAMPHLET, supra note 72, at 52. 
82. Id. at 53. 
83. Id. at 52. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 53. 
86. Id. 
87. Sally G. Mahoney, State Women’s Council Hears Proposals for 1973 Legislation, THE 
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tallies were counted, the executive director of the Washington State 
Women’s Council, Gisela Taber, offered a reason for a possible defeat of 
the amendment: “People think what they read in a voters’ pamphlet is 
gospel, but in reality some of those statements were misleading, to say the 
least.”88 One supporter of the amendment noted, “Many men and women 
are afraid of its implications—they didn’t understand it.”89 Still, the 
Pamphlet’s statements remained unchanged and Washington voters 
approved the amendment only by a small margin: 50.1% to 49.9%.90 
Throughout the counting of the absentee ballots, the fate of the 
amendment seemed uncertain.91 Ultimately, King County voters provided 
the biggest push in favor of the amendment, and Thurston County 
provided the smallest majority, where the amendment won by only eleven 
votes.92 
II. THE FEDERAL EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT: THE 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND THE STATE ACTION 
REQUIREMENT 
A. The Standard of Review 
1. The Standard of Review Used at the Federal Level 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that, unlike race-based 
discrimination which is subject to strict scrutiny, sex-based discrimination 
claims are reviewed under the less rigorous intermediate standard of 
review.93 Although activists have made repeated attempts to persuade the 
Court to apply a higher level of scrutiny to gender-based discrimination—
and although lower courts have criticized the intermediate standard of 
review as being vague—the Supreme Court continues to apply 
intermediate scrutiny to classifications based on gender.94 Yet the Court 
                                                     
SEATTLE DAILY TIMES, Nov. 17, 1972, at C1. 
88. See Marcia Schultz & Janet Horne, Rights Vote a ‘Surprise’; Pros Hoping, SEATTLE DAILY 
TIMES, Nov. 8, 1972, at G1 (quotations omitted). 
89. See id. (quotations omitted). 
90. See DON BRAZIER, HISTORY OF THE WASHINGTON LEGISLATURE: 1965–1982, at 20 (2007). 
91. See Shelby Gilje, Equal Rights Amendment Won by Less than 3,400 Votes, SEATTLE DAILY 
TIMES, Nov. 29, 1972, at B5. 
92. Id. 
93. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 218 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (holding that 
classifications based on sex are subject to intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment rather than strict scrutiny.). 
94. See Linda J. Wharton, State Equal Rights Amendments Revisited: Evaluating Their 
Effectiveness in Advancing Protection Against Sex Discrimination, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1201, 1211, 
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itself “has had some difficulty in agreeing upon the proper approach and 
analysis in cases involving challenges to gender-based classifications.”95 
Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the Court lacked cohesiveness 
specifically regarding the appropriate standard of review, referencing the 
Court’s general application of intermediate scrutiny to gender-based 
classifications, but noting that the Court still “takes on a somewhat 
‘sharper focus’ when gender-based classifications are challenged.”96 
However, the text of the proposed federal Equal Rights Amendment 
indicates that Congress intended for classifications based on sex to be 
prohibited absolutely.97 Were the federal amendment to be formally 
adopted, some legal scholars have argued that this prohibition would 
require federal courts to apply an absolute standard of review—a standard 
even higher than strict scrutiny—or at the very least strict scrutiny itself.98 
2. The Standard of Review Applied by the States 
This general confusion at the federal level regarding the standard of 
review to be applied to sex-based classifications has led to a lack of 
uniformity among the states.99 The courts in states that have adopted their 
own versions of the federal Equal Rights Amendment apply differing 
standards of review.100 Rather than consistently applying the muddled 
intermediate scrutiny standard employed by federal courts to sex-based 
discrimination claims, the majority of states with an equal rights 
amendment use a higher level of scrutiny.101 
Two states—Pennsylvania and Washington—apply an absolute 
standard of review.102 This means that a sex-based classification “is 
invalid, unless it is based upon physical differences between the sexes.”103 
Other states utilize the strict scrutiny standard of review, which presumes 
that classifications based on sex are invalid unless the state is able to show 
                                                     
1213 (2005). 
95. Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 464, 468 (1981). 
96. Id. (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n* (1976)). 
97. See Avner, supra note 52, at 148. 
98. See, e.g., id. (“The proposed federal amendment clearly reflects Congressional intent that sex 
be prohibited as a basis for classification in any law, regulation or governmental policy . . . [an] 
‘absolute’ standard of review.”). 
99. Id. at 147–48. 
100. See Paul B. Linton, State Equal Rights Amendments: Making a Difference or Making a 
Statement?, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 907, 911–15 (1997). 




Hodgins_Post flip thru.docx (Do Not Delete) 2/6/2020  10:31 AM 
38 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:27 
 
that the classification advances a compelling state interest and that the 
classification is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.104 Some states 
with equal rights amendments employ the federal standard: intermediate 
scrutiny.105 Rather than providing ammunition to critics of state equal 
rights amendments, the lack of consistency among the states in applying 
a standard of review indicates that these state amendments may be more 
powerful tools than those offered by federal law; in some instances, state 
equal rights amendments afford more protection against sex-based 
discrimination than other protections currently available at the federal 
level.106 
3. The Standard of Review Applied by Washington Courts 
In Washington, the ERA “absolutely prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of sex.”107 Washington courts have found that the amendment 
“mandates equality in the strongest of terms.”108 By finding that the 
amendment requires the application of an absolute standard of review, 
Washington courts generally offer greater protections against 
discriminatory, sex-based classifications than other states that apply a less 
stringent standard of review to their own state equal rights amendments.109 
This absolute prohibition gives substantial strength to Washington’s ERA. 
The legislative history of Washington’s ERA indicates that the 
Washington legislature intended that courts apply a standard of review 
even more rigorous than strict scrutiny; during the second reading session 
of the amendment on the floor of the state senate, Senator Albert 
Rasmussen declared, “[n]ow this proposed constitutional amendment is 
very clear, you cannot draw the line on account of sex for anything.”110 
Senator Rasmussen’s remarks were indicative of the amendment’s 
absolute prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex.111 Since its 
enactment, Washington courts have interpreted the ERA as constituting 
an absolute prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex—in 
accordance with legislative intent.112 
                                                     
104. Id. at 912. 
105. Id. at 914. 
106. See Avner, supra note 52, at 149. 
107. Nat’l Elec. Contractors Ass’n v. Pierce Cty., 100 Wash. 2d 109, 127, 667 P.2d 1092, 1102 
(1983). 
108. Id. 
109. See McCausland, supra note 5, at 468. 
110. See S.J., 42d Leg., 2d Ex. Sess. 347 (Wash. 1972). 
111. Id. 
112. See Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 871, 540 P.2d 882, 889 (1975) (finding that the 
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This absolute standard of review and the harsh test that it imposes on 
sex-based classifications, however, is limited by a few exceptions.113 The 
first exception to this absolute standard originated in Washington State 
Supreme Court’s decision in Seattle v. Buchanan,114 which upheld a 
municipal ordinance banning the public exposure of female breasts.115 The 
dissent noted that where a classification “relates to a physical 
characteristic peculiar to one sex, and not common to both, the 
discrimination may be valid.”116 The second exception to the absolute 
prohibition test permits classifications based on sex if those classifications 
are designed to promote equality of the sexes.117 This exception emerged 
in Marchioro v. Chaney.118 The court found that Washington’s ERA was 
designed to eliminate discrimination, and therefore statutes enacted to 
promote equality were “precisely the purpose of this legislation.”119 
A possible third exception is that Washington courts may “approve sex-
based classifications by finding that the classification does not result in 
different treatment for men and women.”120 The Washington State 
Supreme Court found in Singer v. Hara121 that the state’s prohibition 
against gay marriage did not violate the amendment because the state 
treated both sexes equally: both male couples and female couples were 
denied marriage licenses.122 Similarly, the court in Andersen v. King 
County123 found that Washington’s Defense of Marriage Act did not 
violate the amendment because the law treated “both sexes the same; 
neither a man nor a woman may marry a person of the same sex.”124 
                                                     
legislature’s intent in enacting Washington’s ERA was “to do more than repeat what was already 
contained in the otherwise governing constitutional provisions, federal and state, by which 
discrimination based on sex was permissible under the rational relationship and strict scrutiny tests”). 
113. See McCausland, supra note 5, at 469. 
114. 90 Wash. 2d 584, 584 P.2d 918 (1978). 
115. Id. at 591, 584 P.2d at 921. 
116. Id. at 616, 584 P.2d at 934 (Horowitz, J., dissenting). 
117. See Marchioro v. Chaney, 90 Wash. 2d 298, 308, 582 P.2d 487, 493 (1978). 
118. Id. In Marchioro, a Washington statute required that certain members of the state democratic 
committee be of the opposite sex. Id. at 300, 582 P.2d at 489. The Court held that the purpose of 
Washington’s ERA was to assure women both actual and theoretical rights. Id. at 305–06, 582 P.2d at 
491. Therefore, the statutory requirement that an equal number of both sexes be elected to the committee 
did not violate the ERA because neither sex was able to predominate. Id. at 306, 582 P.2d at 492. 
119. Id. at 306, 582 P.2d at 491. 
120. McCausland, supra note 5, at 470. 
121. 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974). 
122. Id. at 254–56, 522 P.2d at 1192. 
123. 158 Wash. 2d 1, 138 P.3d 963 (2006). 
124. Id. at 10, 138 P.3d at 969. Although this interpretation of Washington’s ERA has yet to be 
formally overturned, the Washington State Supreme Court’s decision in both Singer and Andersen 
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These cases indicate that Washington’s absolute standard of review of 
the ERA is a purposefully harsh test that may be, under certain, limited 
circumstances, flexible.125 Despite the flexibility of this test, the absolute 
standard of review makes the ERA a powerful tool for litigants seeking to 
combat gender-based discrimination. When the Washington State 
Supreme Court first examined the state ERA in Darrin v. Gould126 in 
1975, the majority declared that its language made clear the need for the 
court to apply an absolute standard of review, rather than to “repeat what 
was already contained in the otherwise governing constitutional 
provisions.”127 Justice Horowitz, writing for the majority, stated that 
“[a]ny other view would mean the people intended to accomplish no 
change . . . . Had such a limited purpose been intended, there would have 
been no necessity to resort to the broad, sweeping, mandatory language of 
the Equal Rights Amendment.”128 The Washington State Supreme Court 
read the far-reaching, protective text of the ERA and found it to trigger a 
standard of review far more protective of individual rights than the current 
federal standard.129 The court has not been similarly inclined to read the 
amendment’s state action requirement in such broad terms.130 
B. The State Action Requirement 
Despite the Washington State Supreme Court’s robust and protective 
approach to the standard of review triggered by the ERA, the court has 
failed to be clear or consistent on the subject of the provision’s state action 
requirement. The court’s confusion is  keeping with the “sheer frustration” 
commonly experienced when attempting an analysis of the state action 
requirement and its limits.131 At the federal level, the state action 
                                                     
may be disputed, the “opposite-sex requirement ‘has always been the universal essential element of 
the marriage definition,’” and “[t]his sort of ‘definitional’ argument against marriage between same-
sex couples was prominent in many early cases,” and has since been discredited. Wolf v. Walker, 986 
F. Supp. 2d 982 (W.D. Wis. 2014) (citing Baker v. Nelson, 291 N.W. 2d. 310, 316 (Minn. 1971)). 
The court in Wolf v. Walker acknowledged the similarities between anti-miscegenation laws and the 
prohibition against same-sex marriage. See 986 F. Supp. 2d at 1004 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that Virginia’s anti-miscegenation statutes, which rested “solely upon 
distinctions drawn according to race,” were unconstitutional)). 
125. See McCausland, supra note 5, at 470. 
126. 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975). 
127. Id. at 871, 540 P.2d at 889. 
128. Id. 
129. See Linton, supra note 100, at 911. 
130. See infra section III.C. 
131. See Developments in the Law: State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123 HARV. L. 
REV. 1248, 1250 (2010). 
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requirement has its origins in concerns of separation of powers and 
federalism.132 Now, he argues, “it is time to begin rethinking state action. 
It is time to again ask why infringements of the most basic values—
speech, privacy, and equality—should be tolerated just because the 
violator is a private entity rather than the government.”133 Moreover, at 
the state level, the concerns present at the federal level—separation of 
powers and federalism—are absent.134 Thus, state courts have the freedom 
to be more flexible in their interpretation and definition of state action.135 
1. The State Action Requirement at the Federal Level 
The text of the proposed federal Equal Rights Amendment explicitly 
included a state action requirement.136 This state action requirement, along 
with the Supreme Court’s generally narrow understanding of it, clearly 
confines the breadth of protection offered to individuals bringing 
Constitutional claims of sex discrimination.137 When states were in the 
process of ratifying the federal Equal Rights Amendment, women’s rights 
activists remained hopeful that the Equal Protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment would offer protection to individuals bringing 
claims of sex-based discrimination against private actors.138 Instead, the 
Equal Protection clause reads, “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States.”139 The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the language 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to contain an explicit state action 
requirement, which prohibits discriminatory governmental action and 
does not reach purely private actors.140 Similarly, the failed federal Equal 
Rights Amendment contained an explicit state action requirement, and 
this “obviously . . . limit[ed] the scope of protection afforded by the 
Federal Constitution against sex discrimination.”141 
                                                     
132. See Wharton, supra note 94, at 1227. 
133. Id. at 505. 
134. See Avner, supra note 52, at 150–51. 
135. Id. at 151. 
136. See H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong. 2d Sess., 86 Stat. 1523 (1972) (“Equality of rights under the 
law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.”). 
137. See Wharton, supra note 94, at 1208. 
138. Id. at 1202. 
139. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
140. See Wharton, supra note 94, at 1206. 
141. Id. at 1208. 
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2. The State Action Requirement at the State Level 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s state action requirement derives, in part, 
out of “concerns of federalism, separation of powers and protection of 
individual autonomy.”142 State constitutions, in contrast, need not worry 
about federalism or separation of powers in the same way that the federal 
constitution must.143 Therefore, the state action requirements of the state 
equal rights amendments must be approached individually, on a case-by-
case basis.144 The various equal rights amendments adopted by the states 
differ substantially, particularly in regard to their state action 
requirements.145 Montana’s amendment clearly extends to discrimination 
by private actors.146 Other states, including Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, and 
Virginia, explicitly limit their own equal rights amendments to apply only 
to governmental actors.147 
Perhaps most analogous to Washington’s ERA is Pennsylvania’s 
parallel constitutional provision.148 The plain text of Pennsylvania’s equal 
rights amendment, which reads, “[e]quality of rights under the law shall 
not be denied or abridged in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because 
of the sex of the individual,” is ambiguous on the subject of state action.149 
Pennsylvania courts, grappling with this ambiguity, have held that “[t]he 
rationale underlying the ‘state action’ doctrine is irrelevant to the 
interpretation of the scope of the . . . [a]mendment, a state constitutional 
amendment adopted by the Commonwealth as part of its own organic 
law.”150 According to the Pennsylvania State Supreme Court, any 
                                                     
142. Id. at 1227. 
143. Id. at 1228. 
144. Id. at 1229. 
145. Id. 
146. See MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“Neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation, or 
institution shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of his civil or political rights on 
account of . . . sex.”). 
147. See COLO. CONST. art. II, § 29 (prohibiting the denial of “[e]quality of rights under the 
law . . . by the state of Colorado.”); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 3 (prohibiting denial of “equality of rights 
under the law . . . by the State on account of sex.”); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 18 (prohibiting denial of 
equal protection of the law on account of sex “by the State or its units.”); VA. CONST. art. I, § 11 
(prohibiting “governmental discrimination” on the basis of sex). 
148. Both Pennsylvania and Washington’s equal rights amendments have been similarly 
interpreted by their respective state courts. See, e.g., Inessa Baram-Blackwell, Comment, Separating 
Dick and Jane: Single-Sex Public Education Under the Washington State Equal Rights Amendment, 
81 WASH. L. REV. 337, 353 (2006) (noting that differentiation on the basis of sex alone is 
unconstitutional under both [states’ ERAs].”). 
149. PA. CONST. art. I, § 28. 
150. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Ins. Comm’r of the Commonwealth, 482 A.2d 542, 549 
(Pa. 1984); see supra Part IV. 
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“attempt to employ the state action concept of our federal system . . . [is] 
misplaced.”151 In arriving at its decision, the court used the explicit 
language of the amendment itself.152 The text of Pennsylvania’s equal 
rights amendment is appreciably similar to the language of Washington’s 
equal rights amendment; both use the phrase “under the law,” but make 
no explicit reference to a state action requirement.153 
III. INCONSISTENCIES IN WASHINGTON’S STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 
In order to make sense of the Washington State Supreme Court’s state 
action jurisprudence in regard to the state Equal Rights Amendment, it is 
first necessary to scrutinize the Court’s understanding of the state action 
requirement in relation to other state constitutional provisions.154 The 
Washington State Supreme Court’s analyses of the state constitution’s 
privacy, due process, and free speech provisions reveal a lack of 
consistency and an overreliance on the U.S. Constitution. 
A. Washington’s Privacy and Due Process Provisions 
The Washington constitution’s privacy provision states, “[n]o person 
shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without 
authority of law.”155 The language of Washington’s privacy provision156 
differs considerably from its parallel federal provision: the Fourth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.157 The Washington State Supreme 
Court determined in State v. Simpson158 that “[h]istorical evidence reveals 
that the framers of the Washington [c]onstitution intended to establish a 
search and seizure provision that varied from the federal provision.”159 In 
fact, Washington’s constitutional convention unequivocally rejected the 
                                                     
151. Hartford, 482 A.2d at 549. 
152. Id. 
153. See WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1 (“Equality of rights and responsibility under the law shall 
not be denied or abridged on account of sex.”). 
154. For an analysis of whether a Washington constitutional provision offers greater protections 
than an analogous U.S. Constitutional provision, see infra note 227. 
155. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.  
156. Id. 
157. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”). 
158. 95 Wash. 2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980). 
159. State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 178, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980). 
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exact wording of the Fourth Amendment in favor of the current language 
of Washington’s privacy provision.160 Despite the framer’s inclusion of  
intentionally dissimilar language in Washington’s privacy provision, the 
Washington State Supreme Court has held that “[a]s a general proposition, 
neither state nor federal constitutional protections against unreasonable 
search and seizure are implicated in the absence of state action.”161 This 
demonstrates an overreliance on the U.S. Constitution in the court’s 
interpretations of a state constitutional provisions. 
Washington’s due process clause, which similarly lacks an explicit 
state action requirement reads, “[n]o person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”162 In the 1975 case Borg-
Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Scott,163 the Washington State Supreme 
Court held that only action by the state is “subject to the due process 
requirements of the state and federal constitutions.”164 But in reaching this 
conclusion, the Court relied on Faircloth v. Old National Bank,165 a case 
that focused purely on the state action requirement of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.166 The court in Borg-Warner 
interpreted Washington’s due process provision as requiring the same 
state action as the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.167 Yet 
Washington courts have determined that “where our constitutional 
provision is linguistically different from its parallel in the federal 
constitution, we are not bound to treat the state and federal constitutions 
as coextensive.”168 Therefore, the Borg-Warner Court had the power to 
interpret Washington’s due process clause—which differs considerably 
from the federal Due Process Clause169—as lacking an explicit state action 
requirement.170 
                                                     
160. Id. 
161. In re Personal Restraint of Maxfield, 133 Wash. 2d 332, 337, 945 P.2d 196, 198 (1997) (citing 
State v. Ludvick, 40 Wash. App. 257, 698 P.2d 1064 (1985)).  
162. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
163. 86 Wash. 2d 276, 543 P.2d 638 (1975). 
164. Id. at 276, 278, 543 P.2d at 640.  
165. 86 Wash. 2d 1, 541 P.2d 362 (1975) 
166. See Faircloth v. Old Nat’l Bank, 86 Wash. 2d 1, 6, 541 P.2d 362, 365 (1975) (finding that the 
enactment of a statute authorizing repossession of an automobile “is not in and of itself sufficient state 
action to compel invocation of the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause.”). 
167. See Borg-Warner, 86 Wash. 2d at 278, 543 P.2d at 640 (1975). 
168. See Alderwood Assocs. v. Wash. Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 243, 635 P.2d 108, 116 (1981). 
169. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”). 
170. See supra section II.B.2. 
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B. Washington’s Free Speech Provision 
In the 1981 case Alderwood Associates v. Washington Environmental 
Council,171 the Washington State Supreme Court debated the existence of 
a state action requirement in two provisions of the state constitution: the 
free speech provision and the initiative guarantee.172 The four-member 
plurality contrasted the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which 
explicitly contains a state action requirement,173 and Washington’s own 
free speech provision.174 The plurality in Alderwood explained that that 
case was the Washington State Supreme Court’s first opportunity to 
determine whether these provisions “require[d] the same ‘state action’ as 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”175 In its analysis, the plurality looked to 
analogous provisions in both California and New Jersey’s constitutions, 
which similarly lacked an explicit state action requirement.176 In both 
states, courts had concluded that their constitutional provisions did not 
require state action as defined by the federal government.177 
Although analyzing state action under the Fourteenth Amendment is a 
balancing of interests, the plurality in Alderwood reasoned that there are 
“two factors not restraining state courts when applying state law.”178 The 
first factor is that the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment impacts the entire country.179 Thus the Supreme 
Court must take into account the disparities between the states and create 
a rule that accounts for these variations.180 The second factor is that the 
U.S. Supreme Court “must take a conservative theoretical approach to 
applying the Fourteenth Amendment . . . [because] [f]ederalism prevents 
the [C]ourt from adopting a rule which prevents states from 
experimenting.”181 
The plurality in Alderwood ultimately reasoned that it was not 
                                                     
171. 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981). 
172. See id. at 230, 234, 635 P.2d at 111.  
173. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances”). 
174. Alderwood, 96 Wash. 2d at 240, 635 P.2d at 114. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. at 240–41, 635 P.2d at 114–15. 
177. Id. 
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constrained by the factors limiting the United States Supreme Court, and 
therefore determined that state action was not required182 in order to 
invoke the free speech provision of the Washington Constitution.183 The 
plurality in Alderwood184 also stated that Washington’s initiative 
guarantee185 lacked a state action requirement.186 The plurality conceded 
that its reading of these state constitutional provisions was not without 
limit, and that “[d]etermining when the Washington speech and initiative 
guaranties will apply to private conduct must evolve with each decision, 
for an all inclusive definition is not practicable.”187 The plurality instead 
employed a balancing test analyzing the nature of the speech activity, the 
regulation of that speech, and the use and nature of the private property.188 
Because “[t]he law is not a static concept and it expands to meet the 
changing conditions of modern life,” the Court decided to evolve its state 
action jurisprudence.189 
The 1989 case Southcenter Joint Venture v. National Democratic 
Policy Committee190 disturbed the plurality opinion in Alderwood.191 In 
Southcenter, the Washington State Supreme Court reasoned that 
Washington’s free speech provision made did not explicitly reference 
state action, but that: 
It is a 2-foot leap across a 10-foot ditch, however, to seize upon 
the absence of a reference to the State as the actor limited by the 
state free speech provision and conclude therefrom that the 
framers of our state constitution intended to create a bold new 
right that conflicts with the fundamental premise on which the 
entire constitution is based.192 
The court concluded that the “likely and reasonable explanation” for 
the lack of the explicit state action requirement in the text was that the 
legislators “viewed them as redundant and in the interest of simplicity 
                                                     
182. See id. at 243.  
183. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, 
being responsible for the abuse of that right.”). 
184. Alderwood, 96 Wash. 2d at 243, 635 P.2d at 115. 
185. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(a) (“The first power reserved by the people is the initiative.”). 
186. See Alderwood, 96 Wash. 2d at 243, 635 P.2d at 115. 
187. Id. at 244, 635 P.2d at 116. 
188. Id. 
189. See id. at 239, 635 P.2d at 113. 
190. 113 Wash. 2d 413, 780 P.2d 1282 (1989). 
191. 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981). 
192. Southcenter Joint Venture v. Nat’l Democratic Policy Comm’n, 113 Wash. 2d 413, 424, 780 
P.2d 1282, 1287–88 (1989). 
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simply deleted them.”193 The majority held that “although an express 
reference to ‘state action’ is absent from the free speech provision of our 
state constitution, a ‘state action’ limitation is implicit therein.”194 The 
court reasoned that “compelling policy reasons” supported a finding of a 
state action requirement.195 But in reaching this conclusion, the majority 
relied on the federal policy justifications behind the state action 
requirement. 
The concurrence by Justice Utter in Southcenter lambasted the 
majority’s implication of a state action requirement, finding “[t]he state 
action doctrine is generally inappropriate at the state level . . . Analysis of 
this case following the nonexclusive criteria developed in State v. 
Gunwall . . . shows that the state action doctrine is incongruent with much 
of the state constitution in general.”196 Justice Utter contended that the 
“plain language and drafting history” of the state’s free speech provision 
actually suggested that there was no state action requirement, and that the 
majority had effectively ignored the language of the provision itself.197 
“[T]he adoption and subsequent deletion of the express state action 
requirement in the Washington committee’s first draft strongly suggest an 
awareness and rejection of such a requirement.”198 
C. Washington’s Equal Rights Amendment 
Although the text of Washington’s ERA lacks an express state action 
requirement, the Washington State Supreme Court has found one to be 
implied. Only three years after the adoption of the ERA into the 
Washington State Constitution, the Washington State Supreme Court 
held, “[i]t is agreed by the parties that in order to maintain an action under 
the Equal Rights Amendment, Const. art. 31, § 1 (amendment 61), where 
the alleged discrimination has been effected by a private agency, it is 
necessary to show that some ‘state action’ is involved.”199 Again, the 
Washington State Supreme Court focused on the presence of state action, 
rather than asking whether the ERA did indeed have a state action 
                                                     
193. Id. at 424, 780 P.2d at 1288. 
194. Id.  
195. Id. at 430, 780 P.2d at 1290. 
196. Id. at 435–36, 780 P.2d at 1293 (Utter, J., concurring). 
197. Id. at 435, 780 P.2d at 1293 (Utter, J., concurring). 
198. Robert F. Utter, The Right to Speak, Write, and Publish Freely: State Constitutional 
Protection Against Private Abridgement, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 157, 177 (1985). 
199. See MacLean v. First Northwest Indus. of America, Inc., 96 Wash. 2d 338, 347, 635 P.2d 683, 
688 (1981). 
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requirement.200 In reaching this conclusion, the Court built on Darrin v. 
Gould, which had also failed to extend its analysis to ask whether the ERA 
contained a state action requirement.201 
Even in hearing claims that are not brought directly under 
Washington’s ERA, the Washington State Supreme Court has been 
inconsistent in its analysis of the state action doctrine. Justice Alexander’s 
concurrence in Roberts v. Dudley202 argued that a “powerful source of 
public policy against sex discrimination can be found in this state’s Equal 
Rights Amendment.”203 He continued, 
Respondents and amici have argued that we should not consider 
the ERA as a relevant source of public policy, contending that it 
serves only to prevent sex discrimination by the State. Although 
I would observe that there is no case from this court that supports 
that argument, we need not resolve the issue because we are not 
called upon to enforce a right under our state’s constitution . . . I 
can think of no more appropriate place to glean a state’s 
fundamental policies than its state constitution . . . I am in accord 
with the view expressed by the California Supreme Court when it 
ruled that sex discrimination in employment might support claim 
of tortious discharge in contravention of public policy.204 
Justice Alexander cited Rojo v. Kliger,205 in which the Supreme Court 
of California found that the question of whether a state constitutional 
provision applied to state action was irrelevant, as the provision reflected 
a public policy against gender-based discrimination in employment.206 
Justice Alexander’s concurrence similarly illustrates that Washington’s 
ERA can serve as an underlying basis for understanding and applying the 
law.207 
                                                     
200. Id. at 348, 635 P.2d at 688. 
201. Id. at 347, 635 P.2d at 688. 
202. 140 Wash. 2d 58, 77, 993 P.2d 901, 911 (2000) (concluding that plaintiff had “properly stated 
a cause of action for the tort of wrongful discharge based on the clearly articulated public policy 
against sex discrimination in employment” based on Title 49 of the Washington Revised Code, which 
governs labor relations). 
203. Roberts v. Dudley, 140 Wash. 2d 58, 77, 993 P.2d 901, 911 (2000) (Alexander, J., concurring). 
204. Id. at 78, 993 P.2d at 911–12 (Alexander, J., concurring). 
205. 801 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1990). 
206. See Rojo, 801 P.2d at 389 (finding that “whether article I, section 8 [of the California 
constitution’s employment discrimination provision] applies exclusively to state action is largely 
irrelevant; the provision unquestionably reflects a fundamental public policy against discrimination 
in employment—public or private—on account of sex”). 
207. See infra section IV.B. 
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In Griffin v. Eller,208 a dissent by Justice Talmadge effectively argued 
that Washington’s ERA should be applied to private action.209 Justice 
Talmadge reminded the majority, which had concluded that employers of 
fewer than eight employees were exempt from the statute providing a 
remedy for sex-based discrimination claims, that Washington’s ERA 
provides protections “beyond those of the federal Equal Protection 
Clause,” and that “[e]quality on the basis of sex is not upheld if the 
[statute] provides no remedy whatsoever for sex discrimination for 
women employed in small businesses, the majority of all businesses in the 
state.”210 
Justice Talmadge argued in his dissent that the majority had created 
two classes of employees: individuals employed by larger employers, who 
are statutorily protected and “may vindicate their civil right to be free of 
discrimination,” and individuals who are employed by smaller businesses, 
who are provided no such statutory protection.211 Justice Talmadge 
concluded that the statute,212 even if properly interpreted by the majority, 
was unconstitutional under Washington’s ERA because the statute does 
not protect individuals who experience sex-based discrimination by 
businesses who employ fewer than eight employees.213 This indicates that 
there are statutory gaps in protection of rights that should be filled by the 
ERA. 
IV. THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT AND THE PRIMACY 
OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION 
The existence of state equal rights amendments “indicate[s] a specific 
desire to provide more comprehensive protection against sex 
discrimination than that available under the existing Federal 
Constitution.”214 In the current age of “new judicial federalism,” state 
                                                     
208. 130 Wash. 2d 58, 922 P.2d 788 (1996). 
209. See id. at 58, 95, 922 P.2d at 806.  
210. Id. at 95, 922 P.2d at 805–06. 
211. Id. at 94, 922 P.2d at 805.  
212. Id. The statute at issue in Griffin in 1996 currently reads, “[t]his chapter shall be known as the 
‘law against discrimination.’ It is an exercise of the police power of the state for the protection of the 
public welfare, health, and peace of the people of this state, and in fulfillment of the provisions of the 
Constitution of this state concerning civil rights.” WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.010 (2019). The statute 
still defines “employer” as “any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or in directly, 
who employs eight or more persons and does not include any religious or sectarian organization not 
organized for private profit.” Id. § 49.60.040 (1995). 
213. Griffin, 130 Wash. 2d at 94, 922 P.2d at 805 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).  
214. Wharton, supra note 94, at 1201–02. 
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provisions are becoming increasingly significant to individuals seeking 
more protection than the federal Constitution offers.215 New judicial 
federalism is, according to Justice Brennan, the “[r]ediscovery by state 
supreme courts of the broader protections afforded their own citizens by 
their statute constitutions . . . [which] is probably the most important 
development in constitutional jurisprudence in our times.”216 
The term new judicial federalism is not, in fact, new. Indeed, many 
scholars have maintained that the concept is instead a “rediscovery.”217 
State constitutions were, prior to the 1930s, “the primary vehicle for 
protecting individual rights.”218 Later, from the 1930s until the 1970’s, the 
federal government assumed the role of protector.219 This interpretation 
came to an end in 1969 with the appointment of Chief Justice Warren 
Burger by President Richard Nixon, leading to a conservative shift on the 
U.S. Supreme Court.220 As the Court turned away from judicial activism, 
litigants began to look elsewhere for protection.221 Just as Justice Brennan 
feared, the “increasingly conservative federal judiciary” began to decline 
to protect individual liberties as robustly as it had in the past.222 Civil 
liberties litigants instead searched for protection in state courts, and thus 
the past few decades have seen “an upsurge in state courts’ reliance on 
state declarations of rights in civil liberties cases.”223 
The Washington State Supreme Court’s reliance on the federal 
constitution in its own state constitutional interpretation can be “improper 
and premature.”224 It is a well-established principle that state courts may 
interpret their own state constitutions as being more protective of 
individual rights than their counterparts in the U.S. Constitution.225 
Particularly in instances where the language of provisions in the 
Washington constitution differs from the language of parallel provisions 
                                                     
215. See ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, The New Judicial Federalism, in THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS 127 (Oxford Univ. Press 2009). 
216. Id. at 113. 
217. See G. Alan Tarr, The Past and Future of the New Judicial Federalism, 24 PUBLIUS: J. 
FEDERALISM 63, 64 (1994). 
218. Id. 
219. Id. at 65. 
220. See WILLIAMS, supra note 218, at 115. 
221. Id. 
222. See John Kincaid, Foreword: The New Federalism Context of the New Judicial Federalism, 
26 RUTGERS L.J. 913, 914–15 (1995) (quoting Suzanna Sherry, Foreword: State Constitutional Law: 
Doing the Right Thing, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 935 (1994)).  
223. See Tarr, supra note 220, at 73–74. 
224. State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d 364, 374, 679 P.2d 353, 359 (1984). 
225. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975). 
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in the U.S. Constitution, Washington courts are “not bound to assume the 
framers intended an identical interpretation.”226 In the context of 
Washington’s privacy, due process, and free speech provisions, it may be 
necessary to analyze the Washington State Supreme Court’s overreliance 
on the federal constitution.227 However, in the context of Washington’s 
ERA, the same analysis is unwarranted because is no analogous federal 
provision: the federal Equal Rights Amendment was never ratified. 
A. The Significance of Washington’s Equal Rights Amendment 
Why do Washington litigants generally turn to statutory protections 
against gender-based discrimination, rather than relying on the strength of 
the state ERA?228 Perhaps the answer lies in its point of weakness: its 
implicit state action requirement. The Washington State Supreme Court 
can clarify its interpretation of Washington’s ERA. Without a state action 
requirement, the ERA would become available as a source of rights to a 
much broader range of individuals. And, should Washington courts be 
reticent to eliminate entirely the implicit state action requirement of the 
ERA, a more circumscribed reading of the state action requirement would 
still be beneficial to individuals facing gender-based discrimination, 
particularly to those who endure discrimination at the hands of private 
individuals.229 
Some gender equality advocates have argued that a state action 
                                                     
226. State v. Fain, 94 Wash. 2d 387, 393, 617 P.2d 720, 723 (1980) (finding that the framers of the 
Washington Constitution believed that the word “cruel” sufficiently indicated their intent and thus 
refused to insert the word “unusual” into WASH. art. I, § 14). 
227. In the 1981 Washington State Supreme Court case, Alderwood Associates v. Washington 
Environmental Council, Justice Utter reasoned that state constitutions may be evaluated independently 
of the federal Constitution, particularly when federal protections of individual rights have not “changed 
with the evolution of our society.” 96 Wash. 2d 230, 238, 635 P.2d 108, 113 (1981). Decisions such as 
Alderwood worried critics, who felt that Washington courts were “picking and choosing between state 
and federal constitutions.” State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 703, 674 P.2d 1240, 1250 (1983) 
(Dimmick, J., dissenting). These critics worried that this “reliance on state charters was result-oriented.” 
ROBERT F. UTTER & HUGH D. SPITZER, THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION 12 (2d ed. 2013). The 
Washington State Supreme Court then decided State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 61, 720 P.2d 808, 
812 (1986), in 1986. The majority in Gunwall provided “six nonexclusive neutral criteria synthesized 
from a burgeoning body of authority, relevant to determining whether, in a given situation, the 
constitution of the State of Washington should be considered as extending broader rights to its citizens 
than does the United States Constitution.” Id. at 61, 720 P.2d at 812. As Washington’s ERA lacks an 
analogous federal provision, a Gunwall analysis is unnecessary here. 
228. A search on LexisNexis produced only forty-five cases in Washington that cite to the state’s Equal 
Rights Amendment. A search on LexisNexis for cases that cite Washington’s Laws Against Discrimination, 
WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60 (2019), along with the terms “gender” or “sex” produced almost four hundred 
results. 
229. Wharton, supra note 94, at 1208. 
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requirement impacts women more significantly than men230: 
The major sites of women’s oppression—including the 
nongovernmental workplace and home—are located in the 
private sphere of civil society and therefore have historically not 
been considered appropriate subjects for protection under federal 
constitutional and civil rights law. Gender inequality arising from 
disparities in private power is invisible to a system designed to 
protect individuals from state interference.231 
However, the states, rather than the federal government “with its narrower 
delegated powers,” are charged with regulating the private actions of 
individuals.232 And “[t]he argument for applying constitutional norms 
specifically to private discrimination against women might note that 
women’s physical and occupational confinement in the private sphere 
might well make state omissions of enforcement against discriminatory 
harms particularly hard to prove, necessitating remedies that directly 
reach sex-discriminatory private actors.”233 
Discrimination and violence based on gender is typically “committed 
by private actors, but it is facilitated by state action and inaction.”234 Such 
state inaction may be, according to Justice Talmadge in his dissent in 
Griffin v. Eller,235 a form of state action—a so-called reverse state action. 
Gaps in statutory protection may leave room for discrimination. 
Furthermore, although a number of federal statutes provide protection 
against sex-based discrimination by private actors, these statutes are 
narrow and targeted.236 These protections may be susceptible to repeal, 
and federal agencies may enforce them only in limited circumstances.237 
Thus, Washington’s ERA should be more broadly interpreted as lacking 
a state action requirement. 
B. The Dormant Power of Washington’s Equal Rights Amendment: Its 
Standard of Review and (Lack of a) State Action Requirement 
Washington’s ERA already has one powerful tool at its disposal: its 
                                                     
230. Id. 
231. Sally F. Goldfarb, Violence Against Women and the Persistence of Privacy, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1, 38 (2000). 
232. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutionalizing Women’s Equality, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 735, 755 (2002). 
233. Id. at 757–58.  
234. See Goldfarb, supra note 234, at 12. 
235. 130 Wash. 2d 58, 95–96, 922 P.2d 788, 805–06 (1996) (Talmadge, J., dissenting); see supra section III.C. 
236. See Wharton, supra note 94, at 1208. 
237. Id. at 1209. 
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triggering of an absolute standard of review.238 Washington courts have 
read the plain language of the state ERA as providing an absolute 
prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex.239 Although there 
are some limited exceptions,240 the absolute standard of review applied by 
Washington courts to the state ERA is a point of strength. This standard 
of review is far more protective than the current federal standard—which 
currently applies a somewhat confused intermediate standard of review241 
—and is also more protective than the current standard applied by most 
states.242 The Washington State Supreme Court has made the broad, 
protective determination that the state’s ERA triggers an absolute 
prohibition on gender-based discrimination.243 The court should make the 
same leap with respect to the amendment’s state action requirement. 
Washington courts are not required to find a state action requirement 
implicit within the text of its constitutional provisions. Judith Avner, a 
legal advocate of gender equality, explains, 
The narrow construction of the state action requirement by federal 
courts is intended to protect states’ traditional jurisdiction over private 
actions. States themselves, however, are not under similar constraints 
in interpreting state action doctrine under their own constitutions, and 
are empowered to conclude that less state involvement is required 
under state ERAs than the fourteenth amendment.244 
The court’s interpretation of a state action requirement in Washington’s 
ERA is not mandated by any explicit state action requirement contained 
in the failed federal Equal Rights Amendment. Indeed, Washington courts 
may interpret the state constitution as being more protective of individual 
rights than the parallel provision in the U.S. Constitution. Moreover, the 
federal Equal Rights Amendment is currently stalled, its future is 
uncertain. This suggests that the states which have adopted their own 
equal rights amendments may play a more substantial role in protecting 
against sex-based discrimination. Thus, Washington courts need not waste 
their time analyzing Washington’s ERA through the lens of a failed federal 
amendment. The Washington Legislature was provided a blank slate with 
which to work, and the language of the state amendment was chosen 
                                                     
238. See Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 870, 540 P.2d 882 (1975). 
239. See Sw. Wash. Chapter, Nat’l Elec. Contractors Ass’n v. Pierce Cty., 100 Wash. 2d 109, 127, 
667 P.2d 1092 (1983). 
240. See McCausland, supra note 5, at 469. 
241. Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 464, 468 (1981). 
242. See McCausland, supra note 5, at 469. 
243. Darrin, 85 Wash. 2d at 870, 540 P.2d at 889. 
244. Avner, supra note 52, at 150. 
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specifically to differ from the failed federal amendment. 
Other states’ equal rights amendments also differ considerably from the 
failed federal amendment with regard to the state action requirement.245 
Some states expressly require state action in the plain text of their 
amendments, while others are ambiguous.246 Washington’s ERA falls into 
the ambiguous category. The plain text of the amendment does not contain 
a state action requirement; the ERA reads only that, “under the law,” 
equality of rights shall not be abridged on the basis of sex.247 Though 
ambiguous in its wording, Washington courts insist on finding a state 
action requirement.248 Pennsylvania’s equal rights amendment is similarly 
ambiguous on the subject of state action.249 Just as Washington’s ERA 
reads “under the law,” Pennsylvania’s provision includes the same 
phrase.250 Rather than imply a state action requirement, however, 
Pennsylvania courts have unequivocally decided that its amendment lacks 
such a requirement.251 The Washington State Supreme Court should reach 
the same conclusion. Employing the state action requirement at the state 
level is unnecessary because the plain text of Washington’s ERA is 
ambiguous as to its state action requirement. 
State action jurisprudence in Washington, with respect to state 
constitutional provisions, is generally inconsistent and overly reliant on 
the U.S. Constitution.252 In interpreting Washington’s privacy and due 
process provisions, the Court has relied on parallel federal provisions 
rather than conducting its own independent examination of the state 
constitution.253 Furthermore, the Court has concluded that the language of 
Washington’s free speech provision, which lacks an explicit state action 
requirement, was merely due to arbitrary and haphazard drafting by the 
legislators.254 The plain text of the provision itself indicates the purposeful 
absence of a state action requirement, and the state action doctrine is neither 
                                                     
245. Wharton, supra note 94, at 1229. 
246. Id. 
247. WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1. 
248. See, e.g., MacLean v. First Nw. Indus. Of America, 96 Wash. 2d 338, 347, 635 P.2d 683, 688 
(1981) (determining that the involvement of some state action is required to bring an action under 
Washington’s ERA). 
249. PA. CONST. art. I, § 28. 
250. PA. CONST. art. I, § 28; WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1. 
251. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Ins. Comm’r of the Commonwealth, 482 A.2d 542, 549 (Pa. 1984). 
252. See supra section III.A. 
253. Id. 
254. See Southcenter Joint Venture v. Nat’l Democratic Policy Comm’n, 113 Wash. 2d 413, 424, 
780 P.2d 1282, 1288 (1989). 
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necessary nor appropriate at the state level.255 
Washington’s ERA similarly lacks an explicit state action requirement, 
yet the Washington State Supreme Court has interpreted one to be 
implicit.256 In hearing claims based on the ERA, the Washington State 
Supreme Court has consistently focused on the presence of state action—
rather than the presence of a state action requirement.257 The Court has 
repeatedly made an assumption about the existence of a state action 
requirement without analyzing the basis of that assumption. This has led 
to gaps in statutory protections for individuals facing gender-based 
discrimination and it is a betrayal of public policy and legislative intent. 
In order to more adequately provide protections against gender-based 
discrimination, Washington’s ERA should be interpreted as lacking a state 
action requirement. 
The ERA, absent a state action requirement, would not necessarily be 
a tool to reach all private actors. Rather, it would be a tool that Washington 
courts could use to reach the discriminatory conduct of private individuals 
engaging in the marketplace. The Washington State Supreme Court has 
clearly expressed that there is no natural right to be in business.258 
Moreover, commercial enterprises held open to the public or businesses 
entered into voluntarily are not excused from complying with anti-
discrimination laws.259 
The ERA, were it to be interpreted as lacking a state action 
requirement, would only reach the conduct of private individuals 
                                                     
255. Id. at 436, 780 P.2d at 1293 (Utter, J., concurring). 
256. See supra section III.C. 
257. Id. 
258. See State ex rel. Stiner v. Yelle, 174 Wash. 402, 406, 25 P.2d 91, 93 (1933) (upholding a 
business tax and finding that “the [Washington] constitution defines property as anything subject to 
ownership and, in a sense, one’s business and its earnings are owned by him, but the privilege of 
engaging in business and gainful pursuits under the protection of ours laws is something which must 
and does exist before the business can be established, and something far and away beyond and above 
the mere ownership of a business”). 
259. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (holding that “every person cannot 
be shielded from all the burdens incident to exercising every aspect of the right to practice religious 
beliefs. When followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of choice, the 
limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed 
on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity.”); see also Backlund v. Bd. Of 
Comm’rs of King Cty. Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 106 Wash. 2d 632, 648, 724 P.2d 981, 990 (1986) 
(determining that “[t]hose who enter into a profession as a matter of choice, necessarily face 
regulation as to their own conduct”); State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 187 Wash. 2d 804, 851, 389 
P.3d 543, 566 (2017) (finding that “[a]s every other court to address the question has concluded, 
public accommodations laws do not simply guarantee access to goods or services. Instead, they serve 
a broader societal purpose: eradicating barriers to the equal treatment of all citizens in the commercial 
marketplace.”). 
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engaging in a commercial business—an area that is already subject to a 
great deal of regulation.260 The ERA is, effectively, a constitutional 
exercise of the police power of the state. Police power is typically 
exercised through statutes,261 but even statutes have limitations. Statutes 
such as the Washington laws against discrimination do not protect against 
discrimination that occurs in truly private capacities. Similarly, 
Washington’s ERA would not reach the truly private conduct of 
individuals. It would, however, fulfill its policy objective of prohibiting 
gender-based discrimination by filling in certain gaps left by the 
Washington laws against discrimination.262 This would fall in line with 
Justice Talmadge’s dissent in Griffin v. Eller263: Washington’s ERA could 
still become an element of a court’s rationale, even in a purely private 
lawsuit that involves marketplace conduct. 
If the Washington State Supreme Court is reticent to interpret the ERA 
as lacking a state action requirement or as reaching private conduct, the 
court alternatively could view the ERA from a foundational, policy 
perspective. Justice Alexander’s concurrence in Roberts v. Dudley264 
illustrates the potential value of this reading of the Amendment. The 
Amendment would serve as a reminder of the public policy aims of the 
legislature, and Washington courts could use it to more broadly 
understand and interpret the law. 
CONCLUSION 
The federal Equal Rights Amendment is currently in a comatose 
state—not yet enacted, but not yet entirely abandoned. In its stead, state 
constitutional provisions are becoming increasingly important in 
protecting individual rights. Washington’s ERA could be a powerful tool 
for litigants seeking protection from gender-based discrimination. Its 
utility would only increase were the Washington State Supreme Court to 
interpret it as lacking a state action requirement. The inconsistencies in 
the court’s state action jurisprudence has restricted the usefulness of 
constitutional provisions such as the ERA; Washington courts should 
                                                     
260. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 49 (chapters governing labor regulations). 
261. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.010 (2019) (stating that the statute “is an exercise of the 
police power of the state”). 
262. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.040(11) (stating that the Washington laws against 
discrimination only apply to businesses with more than eight employees); see also Griffin v. Eller, 
130 Wash. 2d 58, 922 P.2d 788 (1996). 
263. 130 Wash. 2d 58, 72, 922 P.2d 788, 794 (Talmadge, J., dissenting). 
264. Roberts v. Dudley, 140 Wash. 2d 58, 77, 993 P.2d 901, 911 (Alexander, J., concurring). 
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resolve these inconsistencies and more broadly interpret the ERA as 
lacking a state action requirement. Asked whether he foresaw “‘any great 
battle mounting’ over women’s rights legislation,” particularly the ERA, 
Washington state Senator Robert C. Bailey said he did not, “unless it 
would be with ‘lawyers who hate to change the mode of law that they have 
studied and learned over the years.’”265 
 
                                                     
265. Sally Gene Mahoney, Women’s-Rights Legislation Faces Uneven Road, SEATTLE DAILY 
TIMES, Jan. 9, 1972, at G7. 
